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Reasons for asking a Reconsideration of 
the conclusions determined by the Sec- 
retary of State in the settlement of the 
claim of the Brig General Armstrong. 

_ — |v^^,L 

To the Hon. Fred'k T. Frelinghuysen^ Secretary of State^ 

Sir : Among the powers of the Executive, vested by Art. 
II, sec. 3 of the Constitution of the U. S. in the President, 
is that " he shall take care that the laws be faithfully exe- 
cuted'' To execute the law in good faith, it must be done 
in accordance with the meaning, spirit, and intent of the 
legislative will, construed by the established principles of ju- 
risprudence and a due regard to the attributes and elements 
of justice.. 

On this greatconservative principle, ordained for the protec. 
tion of the rights of the citizen, a reconsideration of the conclu- 
sion reached by the Department of State in the settlement of 
this case, is most respectfully solicited. And, while it is with 
great deference that this reconsideration is praj^d for, it is also 
not without a firm conviction that the views entertained by 
the Department of State have been arrived at by a miscon- 
ception and a misconstruction of the real purport and spirit 
of the act of Congress. The human mind, in the formation 
of its opinions and decisions, is not infallible, and it may 
not be irrelevant to add that if Chief Justice Marshall, nay, 
if the Supreme Court itself, could, by the enlightenment of 
reason, be convinced of its erroneous decisions and reverse 
the same, the legal mind of the eminent Secretary of State 
is not less susceptible of conviction. 
The following is a copy of the act : 






"An act for the relief of the captain, owners, officers, and 
crew of the late United states private-armed brig General 
Armstrong, their heirs, executors, administrators, agents, or 
assigns. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled^ That the Secre- 
tary of State be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to 
examine, and adjust the claims of the captain, owners, officers, 
and crew of the late private-armed brig; General Armstrono- 
growing out of the destruction of the said brig by a British 
force in the neutral port of Fayal in September, eighteen 
hundred and fourteen, upon the evidence established before 
the Court of Claims, and to settle the same on principles of 
justice and equity ; and that he be, and is hereby, further 
authorized and directed to draw his requisition in favor of 
said claimants, their heirs, executors, administrators, agents, 
or assigns, for the amount which may be by him found due to 
said claimants, on the Secretary of the Treasury, not exceed- 
ing seventy thousand, seven hundred and thirty-nine dol- 
lars, the amount irroved before the Court of Claims^ who is 
authorized to pay the same out of any money in the Treas- 
ury not otherwise appropriated." 

To determine with certainty, and fairly construe the act, 
it is first necessary to ascertain the object of the enactment, 
and what it calls for, in order to decide whether it has been 
faithfully executed. 

The first clause of the act authorizes and directs the Secre- 
tary of State " to examine and adjust " this claim "upon the ev- 
idence established before the Court of Claims, and to settle 
the same upon principles of justice and equity." The word 
" adjust" in the act, is used in its ordinary sense, and means 
" to arrange or prepare for settlement," in contradistinction 
to adjudge^ which means, "to settle and determine by ii ju- 
dicial decree.'^ For a comprehensive understanding of this 
clause of the act, it is of absolute importance first to ex- 
amine and ascertain the nature and character of the evi- 



(lence upon whicli the Secretary is directed to adjust and 
settle tiiis claim, and which is the key to the true construc- 
tion of this act. This evidence consists of depositions taken 
before a commissioner of said court, '' at the request of Sam. 
C. Reid, jr.," and proves the amount of losses of the owners, 
officers, and crew, and authenticates and confirms the docu. 
raentary testimony showing the assignment by the owners 
of all their interest to Captain Reid, "his heirs and assigns 
forever," and the as? i<>:riment by Captain Reid of "all his 
interest whatsoever in said brig and claim," to his son, Sam. 
C. Reid, jr., who was duly empowered to act as the agent 
and attorney for the claimants. (See evidence in Rep. 
Court of Claims, 1st sess. 35 Cong., vol. 2, 1857-58.) 

This is the nature and character of the evidence established 
before the Court of Claims, and upon which the Secretary 
is only authorized to adjust this claim. The word establish 
means " to fix unalterably, to confirm and ratify." Conse- 
buently, the rights of the claimants being adjudged by the 
court upon this evidence, it is fixed unalterably, and con- 
firmed and ratified, as the record shows. It cannot, there- 
fore, be questioned or impeached. 

We now proceed to consider the second clause of the act: 
''And that he be, and is hereby, further authorized and di- 
rected to draw his requisition in favor of said claimants, 
their heirs, executors, administrators, agents or assigns, for 
the amount which may be by him found due to said claim- 
ants, on the Secretary of the Treasury, not exceeding $70,739 
the amount proved before the Court of Claims," &c. 

Now, it being incontrovertible that Mr. Reid, by the evi- 
dence established before the court, is the agent and attorney 
of the officers and crew, and the assignee (through his father) 
of the owners, the Secretary of State, upon this evidence, is 
authorized and directed to draw his requisition in favor of 
the agent and assignee " for the amount which may be by 
him found due to said claimants." Or, in other words, in 
the language of the act, the Secretary is authorized "to draw 



his requisition in favor of said dodmants, their heirs, execu. 
tors, administrators, ogents^ or assigns for the amount which 
ma}- he by him found due to said claimants." So that, taking 
the two clauses of the act together, the true meaning, pur- 
pose, and intent of the law is manifestly clear and palpable 
that the Secretary is authorized and directed, only upon the 
evidence before the court, to draw his requisition in favor of 
the agruf or assignee representing the claimants "/o?* the 
amount ivhich may be by him found due to said claimants." 
And this for the reason that by the directions of the act the 
Secretary can only adjust and settle this claim upon the evidence 
before the court ; and the evidence before the court does not 
establish that any of the claimants are entitled to receive 
one cent of the appropriation, except through the agent and 
assignee, whose powers and rights are fully established by 
this evidence. 

No authorities need be cited to show that an act must be 
so construed that the whole must be carried into eft'ect ; that 
is, one part of the act cannot be executed without the other, 
and applying the test of the principles established for the 
construction of laws, it is obvious that the true spirit and 
intent of this act will not permit of any other construction 
than the one contended for. 

The purpose and intent of the act is, therefore, that the 
Secretary of State shall pay to the agent and assignee "the 
amount which may be by him found due to said claimants." 
The author of the act, Mr. Reid, drew it up with the purpose 
and intent of protecting his rights as agent and assignee, 
which had been recognized and confirmed by the evidence 
before the Court of Claims. Surely, then, the author of the 
language of the act should be capable of expressing as well as 
explaining its meaning and intention, which a large experi- 
ence of forty years at the bar ought to enable him to do. It 
is true that wliile the act directs the Secretary to draw his 
requisition in favor of the agent and assignee of the claim- 
ants, Mr. Reid's name is not mentioned as such, but the evi- 



dence before the Court of Claims does fully recosjiiize and 
confirm him in both capacities; and as the rights of the 
agent and assignee are superior to those of the heirs, execu- 
tors or administrators, the Secretary cannot recognize them 
in jireference, without great injustice, and onl}^ until after 
the agent and assignee ceases to act as such in behalf of the 
claimants. 

The intent and purpose of the bill, before it became an act 
of Congr^'ss, was explained to the Committees on Foreign 
Aflairs of both Houses that the appropriation would be paid to 
Mr. Reid as the agent and assignee of the claimants, which 
would appear by the evidence established before the Court of 
Claims, and which was not only so understood by them, but 
every Senator and Member who voted for the bill did so with 
a full understanding that this was the intention of the act, 
as the debates will show. In the record of the case of the 
brig General Armstrong, it is shown that the Department 
of State for over forty years has acknowledged and recog- 
nized Mr. Reid as the "sole and only authorized agent of 
the claimants." That in all the diplomatic correspondence Mr. 
Reid is alluded to and treated with, by the Department as the 
" sole authorized agent acting for the claimants." In all the 
congressional proceedings from 1844 the petitions, memorials, 
and reports of Congress show that Mr. Reid is recognized 
and affirmed as the " sole authorized agent of the claimants." 
That after this claim had been twice abandoned by this 
Government and finally lost by arbitration, it became an 
abandoned wreck, and was deserted by all persons and par- 
ties in interest, except Mr. Reid, who still continued to pros- 
ecute it in vindication of the national honor and for the 
benefit of the claimants. Pending this whole period all the 
expenses and costs, amounting to over $50,000, have been 
borne by Mr. Reid without adding his personal services, em. 
bracing tlie best years of his life, which wi^uld far exceed the 
sum appropriated. As agent for the officers and crew, and 
assignee of the owners, Mr. Reid's personal claims were 
upon testimony, ordered to be taken by the court, duly 



passed on and admitted, and fully confirmed and established. 
These rights were asserted by the Department of State, which 
has never (questioned his authority to control and manage 
this claim, as well as to receive the sum appropriated, until 
the late action of the present Hon. Secretary of State. 

The authority conferred by the act upon the Secretary is, 
" to examine and adjust these claims, upon the evidence estab- 
lished before the Court of Claims, iiud to settle the same on prin- 
ciples of justice and equity." 

The power given to the Secretary to adjad these claims is 
fixed and determined, and is strictly and directl}' coiijiaed to 
the evidence before the Court of Claims, as the basis upon 
which they shall be adjusted. The act gives no discretionary 
power to adjust these claims outside of this evidence, or upon 
any other basis than that adjudicated by the Court. The 
amount due having already been adjudged by the Court upon 
the evidence before it, and fixed and determined, the act gives 
no equitable discretion or authority^ to alter or change that 
evidence, even if the Secretary was of opinion that the claim- 
ants were entitled to a larger or lesser sum, much less to 
make any different disposition or award afiecting the rights 
of any of the claimants, for the reason that the act positively 
directs the Secretary to adjust these claims uiwn the evidence 
established before the Court. 

According to the act, then, the rights of these claimants 
must first be examined and adjusted upon the evidence before 
the Court, before they can be settled., in order that the settlc- 
7nent may be in accordance with the evidence: Mr. Reid being 
one of the claimants, as well as agent and assignee, his claim 
and his rights must first be adjusted according to the evi- 
dence establishing those rights, before a final settlement or 
payment can legally be made. 

After authorizing the Secretary of State to make this ex- 
amination and adjustment in accordance with the established 
evidence, the act directs him to settle the same " on princi- 
ples of Justice and equity.'' These words were inserted by the 



author of the bill by way of caution, in order to obviate any 
strict technical objections which might arise upon the docu- 
mentary evidence^ upon which the settlement is to be made ac- 
c^rdino- to the evidence before the Court, proving Mr. Reid 
to be the authorized agent, and legal assignee and represent- 
ative of the owners. They can have no relation or applica- 
tion to the adjusting of any claims of either the owners, offi- 
cers, or crew, because the onl}- question involved in their 
case, is the amount of their claims, which is fixed and deter- 
mined by the evidence, and which the act also declares, shall 
" not exceed $70,739, the amount proved before the Court of 
Claims" The Secretary, consequently, can apply no "prin- 
ci{)les of justice and equit}^ " to adjust their claims. The 
only rational applicability, therefore, of the words "to settle 
the same on principles of justice and equity," is the intention 
alread}' ex[)lained. They require the Secretary to act on 
" principles of justice and equity " with regard to the rights 
of the party whom the evidence before the Court of Chiims 
establishes as the agent of the officers and crew, and assignee 
and representative of the owners. The Secretary is, conse- 
quently, only vested with discretio.iary powers for the 
furtherance of justice and equity, for the protection of the 
rights of the agent and assignee, should any legal technical- 
ities be raised to defeat those rights. While his duty, then, 
is con lined to adjust these claims upon the evidence before 
the Court,the discretionary power given, " to settle the same 
upon principles of justice and equity," is also confined and 
limited to "the evidence established before the Court of 
Claims." There is no authority given by the act to settle 
these claims on any other basis, or in any other manner, than 
that warranted, by the evidence. Nor can the Secretary en- 
large his powers by a construction not warranted by the 
Avords of the act " to settle the same on principles of justice 
and equity," and undertake to adjudicate the settlement of 
this claim upon the conceived opinions or views of the De- 
partment of State as to what may be deemed just and equit- 
able. He has no power under the act to exercise judicial 



8 

authority by a settlement on any discretionary or compro- 
mise basis, as between the officers and crews and the agent, 
nor undertake the distribution of this fund, as no such power 
is contained in, and never was contemplated by the act. Nor 
can the Secretary act judioially under the act to settle this 
claim as to the mode of settlement between the owners and 
assignee, as that is settled by law under the act of assign- 
ment, which has been proved to be legally authenticated, 
and confirmed by the evidence of the Court. 

The Supreme Court of the U. S. has decided, in the case 
of Beatty's Exr., that " no part of the Judicial poirer, under 
the Constitution of the U. S. can be conferred upon an exec- 
utive officer," And in the case of Stnrgis, Bennett & Co., 
where an act of Congress authorized the Secretary of the 
Treasury to refund money paid by importers " whenever it 
should be shown to his satisfaction," that it had been illegally 
exacted, this court decided " that the power which it (the 
act) confers upon the Secretary of the Treasury is purely ad- 
ministrative, and in no sense judicial." And the court fur- 
ther said that " it would be a most dangerous j^rinciple to es- 
tablish, that the acts of a ministerial officer, when done in good, 
faith, however injurious to -private rights, and unsupported, by 
law, shoxdd afford no grounds for legal i^edress ;" that " it (the 
law) did not vest the Secretary of the Treasury with the 
power to decide upon the rights of the claimant, except to the 
extent that he may he i^equircd to act upon them." For, said the 
court, " it is no answer to this view, that in such a case the 
party was without remedy except by an appeal to the legis- 
lative department of the Government ; for if that were suf- 
ficient then there would be but few Q.2i%Q^ oi contract of which 

this court could take cognizance." 

This decision covers this whole case,and defines the extent 

of powers vested by the act in question in the Secretary of 

State. The law does not vest the Secretary " //•///;, the power 

to decide upon the rights of the claimants, except to the extent that 

he might be required to act upon them" For the intent of the 

act is to treat as res judicata the action of the Court of 



Claims, and to deny to any other tribunal the power to dis- 
turb its judicial findings. The act exi)licitly says that the 
evidence taken before the Court of Claims was established ; 
in other words, that the respective rights of the parties must 
be deemed and treated as fully and finally settled by the 
court, leaving to the officer named in the act the power sim- 
ply to disburse the sum appropriated wholly and entirely in 
accordance with the evidence so fixed and established by that 
court. And this is the extent to which the Secretary is re- 
quired by law to act on the rights of the claimants. 

It must not be overlooked that this, law is " for the relief 
OF THE AGENTS AND ASSIGNS of the Captain, owucrs, officers, 
and crew, as well as of the parties themselves, which the title 
of the act declares. The Secretary, therefore, cannot decide 
upon the rights of the elcimants, " except to the extent that 
HE MIGHT BE .REQUIRED TO ACT vpou them " uuder the law. 
That extent is "to adjust the claims upon the evidence 
established before the Court of Claims^ and to settle the mme on 
principles of justice and equity." JSfow, what are the rights of 
Mr. Reid, the claimant, agent, and assignee, in this case, and 
who is alluded to as such by all the judges of the Court of 
Claims in their decisions, and for whose relief this act was 
passed as well as any other of the claimants ? 

1st. As the agent of the officers and crew he is stamped 
and authenticated as such on every official act and proceed- 
ing of every department of the Government, legislative, judi- 
cial, and executive, relating to this case, and his ri<i:ht to 
receive for the claimants the amount which he himself caused 
to be proved up before the court cannot be denied. This 
right is supported by the recognized custom of the Depart- 
ment of State and all the courts of the Union to pay over to 
the authorized agent and attorney of record, on the recovery 
of judgment claims, the amount of the judgment. On this 
ground alone it is impossible to conceive how the Department 
can deny to the agent and attorney the benefit of this universal 
custom and rule of law in a case of such extraordinary and 
yj-j aralleled character. 

r 



10 

2d. As the assignee of the owners Mr. Reid (througli his 
father) is vested with all the rights of the owners themselves 
to receive the amouiit found due them by the Court of Claims 
and ai)pro})riated by the act. 

The original assignment of the owners "transfers and sets 
over unto Ca|»tain Sam. C. Reid.his heirs and assigns for ev 67- 
all our right, title, and interest in the late brig General 
Armstrong; and further authorizes the said Captain Keid 
Irj'evorably as our attorney and agent to take such legal pro- 
ceedings in the premises and to receive such moneys and make 
such corn-promises and agreements as to him may seem meet and 
proper." 

It is thus manifest that by virtue of this assignment the 
fullest powers were vested in Captain Reid by the owners 
not only to receive " such moneys," but to make such " com- 
promises " and. " agreements " as to him may seerrp proper^ gave 
to Captain Reid the most enlarged and unlimited powers to 
act as he might deem expedient. All these powers, with the 
interest of the owners, were vested in Captain Reid, " A/^' 
heirs., and assigns, forevo- ; " therefore by the assignment of 
Captain Reid to his son, Mr. Reid became the agent and 
assignee of the owners io the fullest extent, and stands ex- 
actly in the same position, as the agent and assignee of the 
owners, as if they liad made the original assignment directly 
to Mr. Reid himself. If the court did not and could not 
question tlie legality of this assignment, clothed with all the 
solemnities of the forms of judicial requirements in its exe- 
cution, acknowiedgment, and attestation, from whence does 
the Secretary derive the power, as an executive officer, to 
reject this evidence, or only to admit it in j)art, [for it must 
be either wholly admitted or excludeil,] when he is directed 
to adjust these claims according to the evidence before the 
Court of Claims? To acknowledge any of the rights of tlie 
assignee under the assignment is to admit them all. To 
prevent any such irregular action, the Secretary is directed 
to settle this claim "on princi[tles of justice and equity;" for 
the exercise of any such supervisory or judicial power would 



11 

be to reverse and ignore the judgment of tlie court settling 
the rights of the claimants which is based upon this evi- 
dence ; the ettect of which would be not only to render the 
act void and ineffective, but also to defeat the object for 
which the act was passed by an unreasonable and illegal 
construction. These are the only priiici[)les of justice and 
equity that were intended should govern this case in the 
faithful execution of this law. 

Notwithstanding the judicial position assumed by the De- 
partment of State, it has admitted and recognized the right 
and authority of the agent and assignee, not only to draw 
against the fund appropriated by this act, but has paid him 
a portion of it also on account of the amount due to the 
officers and crew, as well as the owners, and for which it 
has acknowledged and accepted his receipts for the same, 
signed as "-Agent for the officers and crew, and assignee of 
the owners of the brig General Armstrong," while there has 
not been, as yet, any flnal settlement of tliis claim. 

Certainly, if the Department of State cannot be vested with 

judicial powers, it cannot undertake to adjudge and as arbiter, 
to tix and settle the accounts of Mr. Reid witl the officers 
and crew by the allowance of forty i»er cent., or any other 
sum, for the reason that the Secretary is not required, nor 
authorized by the law, to act upon the rights of the claim- 
ants, and he cannot, therefore, adjudicate upon them by an 
award distributing this fund, which is wholly unauthoiized 
by the act. And for the same reason, neither can the Sec- 
retary make any settlement or adjudication between the own- 
ers or their heirs and the assignee, in violation of the assign- 
ment, by divesting the assignee of his right to the claim of 
the owners transferred " to Ca})t. Reid, his heirs and as.s>_g/i..'< 
/ort'ver," for it would be treating the act of transfer as a nul- 
lity, and abrogating the law of contracts. 

The Department of State, in Feb., 1879, at the instance of 
President Hayes, and by the request of Mr.Reid, after a full 
investigation of all the official correspondence, documents, 
and evidence in this case by the law officer of the Depart 
meut of State, decided that the Government "is bound under 



12 

the extraordinary circumstances of this case, in equity, iu 
morals, and in honor, to make reparation to their own citi- 
zen, the private claimant." Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, 
fully approved of this report, and "the justice and equity of 
the claimant's appeal (Mr. Reid) to his own govern u 'en t," 
and recommended Congress to make the appropriation. The 
law officer of the Department, at the time of this report, had 
made thorough a examination of this case in all its branches, 
and Mr. Reid was fully recognized at the time as the agent 
and assignee of this claim. 

On the bill becoming a law, the right of Mr. Reid to re- 
ceive the amount appropriated as agent and assignee was 
submitted to the law officer upon the evidence produced be- 
fore the Court of Claims. In his report he states that " Mr. 
Reid, jr., the present claimant, has been recognized and 
known to the Department, the President, to Congress, and 
the Court of Claims, as the sole and only agent and repre- 
sentative of t^iis claim, from 1840 to the present day." * 

* * " SuH|iect only to such equity liens as Sam. C. Reid, 
jr., may have created upon the fund during the prosecution 
of the claim, I am of the opinion that he is entitled at law 
and in equity to receive and receipt for the whole amount 
appropriated by the act of Congress." 

" The heirs-at-law of Captain Reid have no standing in 
court against this fund ; he long ago assigned atid trans- 
ferred all his interest, remoie and contingent, to the present 
claimant, Sam. C. Reid, Jr. Under the various powers 
and transfers, he, Reid, Jr., is also entitled to receive and re- 
ceipt on account of the officers and crew ; he is to settle and 
adjust with them. It is not the business of the Department. 
They have made him, Reid, their trustee, agent, and re[»re- 
sentative, and he certainly has shown himself a most faith- 
ful representative." 

The law officer, on the 14th of July, 1882, on intimation 
from the Assistant Secretary, that the above report did not 
present the proper mode of distribution according to the in- 
tent and meaning ot the act of Congress, an additional report 
was made in which the legality of the documentary evidence 



13 

before the court is pronounced upon. This report sa3^s: 
" The assignment of December 12, 1856, from Capt. Reicl to 
his son, Sam C. Reid, Jr., is an assignment of all and singu- 
lar his rights in the vessel and the daim^ and all that he, the 
assignor, might have in any moneys recovered to Reid, Jr., 
the claimant. This document is also good in form and sub- 
stance. But suppose his legal right is questioned, is he not 
clearly entitled on the plainest principles of equity ? He has 
prosecuted the case for more than an ordinary lifetime." vi 
""^ In justice to myself, perhaps, and to prevent any misun- fs 
derstanding of my motives in so strenuously presenting these 
views to the Hon. Secretary, I should add, that there never 
has been any purpose on my part to evade paying to any per- 
son entitled to any portion of the sum appropriated, -^nd, 
further, that my only purpose is, to insist on my clear right to 
receive the entire sum, {less the amounts already paid out,) as 
established by the evidence, holding myself ready hereafter to 
make just application and payment to any person who may 
be entitled to receive any portion thereof. In other words, 
the act of Congress intends that the executive officer shall 
make payment in the first instance to Sam C Reid, Jr., as 
agent and assignee, leaving upon him the_duty to distribute 
justly and fairly as t':'ustee to the respective beneficiaries^^ 
their respective proportions and shares.yThe assurance is need- 
less that if the trustee should fail in his duties, the benefici- 
aries can enforce their rights in the appropriate judicial tri- 
bunals, whose methods of procedure are far better adapted 
to ascertain and fix the rights of the parties, than any de- 
partment witn its imperfect modes of inquiry,and which cer- 
tainly are inadequate to the attainment of this object. 

With the fullest confidence in the desire of the Honor- 
able Secretary of State faithfully to execute the law by con- 
formino; with the true meaning and intention of this act of 
Congress, and to render that justice which the spirit of 
equity demands, I most respectfully submit the foregoing to 

his careful consideration. 

SAM. C. REID. 

Washington, D. C, Nov. W, 188^. 



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